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Abstract: We experimentally examine the impact of buyer concentration on the pricing of a
monopolist. In our experimental markets, a monopolist faces either two or four buyers. Markets
with two buyers achieve signi¯cantly lower prices, sometimes below competitive levels, than those
with four buyers. We design an additional pair of treatments to pinpoint the source of this di®erence.
We attribute the lower prices in the two-buyer treatment to the monopolist pricing more cautiously
when there are fewer buyers in order to avoid costly losses in sales. Buyer concentration may thus
be an e®ective source of countervailing power.
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experiments.1 Introduction
\In the typical modern market of a few sellers, the active restraint is provided not by competitors but
from the other side of the market by strong buyers ...At the end of virtually every channel by which
consumers' goods reach the public there is, in practice, a layer of powerful buyers." (Galbraith, 1952,
pp. 112, 126)
\I would expect bilateral oligopoly to be relatively monopolistic in operation ...it simply is romantic to
believe that a competitive solution will emerge, not merely in a few peculiar cases, but in the general run
of industries where two small groups of ¯rms deal with one another suddenly all the long-run advantages
of monopolistic behavior have been lost sight of in a welter of irrational competitive moves." (Stigler,
1954, p. 9)
Buyers are typically treated as passive price-takers in economic theory with sellers as the only
strategic players. Yet in non-retail trade, there is no theoretical or apparent reason why buy-
ers should be any less in°uential in establishing the price than sellers. Since Bertrand's (1883)
provocative ¯nding that two ¯rms competing in prices are su±cient to bring about the competitive
outcome, the question of the competitiveness of a market as a function of seller concentration has
been a hotly debated one.1 In sharp contrast, the analogous topic concerning the impact of buyer
concentration on market outcomes remains underexplored.
Galbraith (1952) introduced the notion that a small number of buyers can act as a countervail-
ing force against the market power of a small number of sellers. His idea, however, was initially
dismissed as far-fetched (see e.g. Stigler, 1954, and the above quotation, and Hunter, 1958). More
recently, however, numerous cross-sectional empirical studies demonstrate that the more concen-
trated the buyers' side of the market, the lower are sellers' price-cost margins (see, e.g., Scherer
and Ross (1990, pp. 533-535) for an overview of this evidence).
In this paper we examine experimentally the ability of a small number of buyers to in°uence
monopolist pricing and the means by which buyers are able to do so. We do this by comparing
the pricing of a monopolist in a full-information, 30-round experimental market with two buyers to
pricing in an identical market with four buyers. In our posted-o®er markets, the monopolist makes
a take-it-or-leave-it o®er to buyers who then decide whether to accept or reject the o®er. Strategic
buyer behavior is therefore limited to rejecting pro¯table purchases, i.e. rejecting purchases at a
price below the buyer's valuation, referred to as demand withholding. In our experiments, buyers
1 See, for instance, Stiglitz (1987), Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Isaac and Reynolds (2002), and Huck et
al. (2004).are unable to collude, to make a counter-o®er or negotiate a better price.
Our results show that markets with two buyers attain signi¯cantly lower prices than those with
four buyers, despite the inability of buyers to coordinate with one other and other controls built
into the experimental design. In order to understand the behavioral mechanism through which
concentrated buyers a®ect monopoly pricing, we designed an additional pair of treatments in which
the monopolists, but not the buyers, were unaware of the number of buyers in the market. Results
from these \uninformed" treatments indicate that it is more likely that monopolists price cautiously
when facing more concentrated buyers than it is that concentrated buyers act to bring down prices
through increased demand withholding. Dynamic panel regressions support this conclusion.
These experiments highlight the countervailing role that buyer concentration may play in real-
world markets: even when changes in the number of buyers (either through mergers, entry or
exit) may be observed in real-world industries, concurrent unobservable changes (e.g., in demand
conditions) are likely to follow, rendering attempts to disentangle the e®ect of buyer concentration
di±cult at best. Laboratory experiments have the ability to control for such unobservables and
thus isolate the impact of buyer concentration.
Our results begin to ¯ll a gap for evidence-based antitrust policy, which recognizes the potential
role buyers may play in preventing collusion, but which lacks clear guidelines in practice. The 1982
revisions to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines cite the \ability of sophisticated buyers to devise long-
term contracts to break collusive agreements" as a measure to evaluate the competitiveness of an
industry. However, the absence of clear empirically established criteria or theoretical benchmarks
for buyers' in°uence may explain what may be interpreted as the courts' reluctance to approve
mergers despite a seemingly concentrated buyer side of the market. For instance, in United States
v. Country Lake Foods, Inc. (1990), the court refused to enjoin a merger where three large customers
accounted for 90% of all purchases in the relevant product market. More recently, America's ¯rst
and second largest pharmaceutical companies concurrently proposed to merge with the industry's
fourth and third largest ¯rms, respectively. The justi¯cation put forth for these multi-billion dollar
mergers was the claim that 80% of the estimated $306.9 million in ¯xed-cost savings due to the
elimination of redundancies would be passed onto large pharmaceutical buyers, mainly hospitals,
2purchasing blocs that represent groups of hospitals and retail chains like Wal-Mart, in the form
of lower prices. Again, perhaps in the absence of well-established guidelines for the countervailing
ability of large buyers, the courts (FTC v. Cardinal Health and FTC v. McKesson Corp.) blocked
both mergers. Our results suggest that pricing behavior may indeed be in°uenced by the number
of buyers in a market.
Section 2 surveys the role of buyers in the experimental literature. We detail the experimental
design and procedures for the two-buyer and four-buyer \informed" treatments in section 3. Section
4 presents the results of these treatments as well as the results for two additional \uninformed"
two-buyer and four-buyer treatments. In section 5, we discuss the importance of the experimental
parameters and information for demand withholding and the exercise of monopoly power, and
explore an application of our results to increasing industrial concentration. Section 6 concludes.
2 Buyer Behavior in Previous Posted-O®er Experiments
In a posted-o®er market experiment, sellers o®er to sell a speci¯c quantity of a good at a price,
and then buyers accept or reject the o®ers. Supply and demand curves are induced in the game
such that for any ¯nitely repeated game, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is for buyers to
make all pro¯table purchases in each period. Most posted-o®er market experiments implement
this solution by replacing human with simulated buyers. These computerized buyers automatically
purchase from the lowest-price seller and continue to do so as long as the price is less than (or equal
to) the buyer's valuation.
Computerized buyers have been standard in this literature because researchers have focused
on seller behavior; by eliminating variation among the buyers, seller behavior can be studied in
a highly controlled setting. Nonetheless exceptions to the replacement of human buyers with a
myopic pro¯t-maximizing computer algorithm do exist.2 Smith (1981), for example, conducts a
single experimental session with a posted-o®er monopolist facing ¯ve human buyers. In his 11-
round experiment, not a single instance of withholding is observed and prices converge in period 5
2 See Ru²e (forthcoming) for a detailed survey of the experimental and theoretical literatures on buyer power.
3to the monopoly price.
Other experiments comparing human and simulated buyers reveal less extreme buyer and mo-
nopolist behavior. Coursey, Isaac and Smith (1984) and Brown-Kruse (1991) test the contestable
markets hypothesis with a decreasing-cost monopolist facing either computer-simulated or ¯ve hu-
man buyers. The decreasing-marginal-cost structure implies that demand withholding hits the
monopolist's most pro¯table units ¯rst. Both studies ¯nd that prices approach or even converge
to competitive levels. Moreover, while prices are lower in sessions with instances of demand with-
holding, the mere presence of human buyers is su±cient to bring about lower prices compared to
sessions with simulated ones.
Ru²e (2000) tests the impact of a number of variables on demand withholding and the pricing
of duopolist sellers. Fewer buyers and experimental designs with more unequal surplus divisions
at the market-clearing price in favor of the sellers are shown to increase withholding and lower
duopolists' posted prices. One possible explanation for the e®ectiveness of two buyers in Ru²e
(2000) is that if one of the two buyers withholds his units of demand, then the two sellers must
compete in price for the business of the remaining buyer. This led to the observed downward spiral
in prices. The four-buyer treatments, by contrast, require three of the four buyers to withhold their
entire demand schedules for this ¯erce price competition between sellers to ensue.
Normann, Ru²e and Snyder (2005) relax the assumption of buyers of equal size to explore
the impact of buyer size on posted bids against a monopolist in markets with either decreasing,
constant or increasing marginal costs. In accordance with the theory, large-buyer discounts emerge
only in the case of increasing marginal costs.
Davis and Wilson (2006) depart from earlier private-information posted-o®er experiments by
making the supply and demand curves common knowledge. They examine the impact of mergers
(quadropoly to duopoly) with ¯xed-cost, variable-cost or no-cost synergies on pricing in which
¯rms face either human or simulated buyers. Human buyers attain signi¯cantly lower prices than
simulated ones, both pre- and post-merger. In addition, human buyers are able to extract a portion
of both ¯xed- and variable-cost synergies from the sellers.
Our paper di®ers from the existing literature in several respects. While Ru²e (2000) and Davis
4and Wilson (2006) study markets with multiple sellers, we control for price competition between
sellers by studying monopolies. Also unlike Davis and Wilson (2006), we design treatments to
understand the source of the lower prices observed when buyers are concentrated. By endowing
each buyer regardless of treatment with the identical individual demand curve, we control for
di®ering opportunity costs of withholding among buyers that may account for the results in Ru²e
(2000). Finally, we focus on the number of buyers, rather than their size as in Normann, Ru²e,
and Snyder (2005).
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
3.1 Experimental Design
Subjects were randomly assigned the role of buyer or seller in markets with a monopolist and either
two or four buyers. Buyers were given a schedule of valuations for units of a good, and sellers were
given a schedule of costs. To induce subjects to trade, they were told that buyers earn the di®erence
between their valuations and the price they pay on each unit they purchase, while the seller earns
the di®erence between the price and his cost on each unit sold. The costs of unsold units are not
subtracted from the monopolist's pro¯ts.
Figures 1a and 1b display the monopolist's marginal cost curve and the buyers' aggregate
demand curve for the two-buyer and four-buyer treatments, respectively. The ¯gure reveals that
every buyer possesses four units of demand regardless of experimental treatment, the ¯rst unit of
which is valued at 35 units of currency above the competitive price (+0.35), the second and third
units have values of +0.20 each, and the fourth unit has a value of +0.05.
These parameters remained static throughout the 30-round experiment, and were made common
knowledge by providing each subject with a table of costs and values of all subjects, and by reading
aloud the contents of the table. The market structure in these two treatments was also common
knowledge so that the monopolist (and the buyers) knew precisely how many (other) buyers were in
the market. The results of these \informed" two-buyer and four-buyer treatments led us to design
two additional treatments in which the monopolist was uninformed of the number of buyers in the
5market.3
We held constant across treatments a number of variables believed to be important to demand
withholding and seller pricing. For instance, notice that both treatments share the same ten-unit,
competitive price range. The midpoint of the competitive range has been normalized to zero,
with all other prices, costs and valuations henceforth expressed as deviations from this competitive
price.4 Moreover, both treatments share the identical monopoly price of 20 units of currency
above the competitive price (+0.20).
[insert Figures 1a and 1b here]
These parameters are based on experiments in Ru²e (2000). In that paper, two sellers faced
either two or four buyers. The demand and cost parameters in two of the treatments (2b3sF
and 4b6sF) correspond exactly to those in our two-buyer treatment in Figure 1a. The di®erence
between these two treatments in Ru²e (2000) is that the duopolists faced two buyers in one
treatment (2b3sF) and four buyers in the other (4b6sF). Buyers in the 2b3sF withheld seven times
as many units of demand as those in 4b6sF, leading to signi¯cantly lower prices. The most probable
explanation for the relatively intense withholding in 2b3sF is that each buyer possessed twice as
many units of demand compared to buyers in 4b6sF, thereby lowering buyers' marginal cost of
withholding. To control for this explanation, we have endowed all buyers in these experiments with
identical individual demand curves, regardless of identity or treatment.
Another variable found to be important for the exercise of buyer power and duopolists' pricing in
Ru²e (2000) is the theoretical surplus division between individual buyers and sellers at a benchmark
price. To hold this constant across our two treatments in which all buyers in both treatments are
endowed with identical individual demand curves requires a shift in portions of the monopolist's cost
curve. Given the abundance of theoretical, empirical and experimental evidence of the relevance
of fairness and inequality aversion in determining price outcomes and the absence of such evidence
3 We discuss this second set of \uninformed" treatments in Section 4.2.
4 The actual competitive price was 1.90 for half of the experiments and 3.90 for the other half. This between-
experiment, two-unit shift is standard practice in market experiments to avoid the critique that the observed results
are dependent on the particular parameters chosen. We ¯nd no signi¯cant di®erence in monopolists' prices between
the two sets of parameters.
6about the height of portions of the seller's cost curve, we elected to control for the former across
markets, necessitating variation in the latter. The results from our two-buyer and four-buyer
uninformed treatments provide evidence of the benignity of the change in interior portions of the
monopolist's cost curve.
The cost curve in the four-buyer treatment (Figure 1b) has been chosen such that the monopoly
price (+0.20) and competitive price (0.00) are the same in each of the treatments. Moreover, at the
competitive price, the monopolist seller earns exactly six times as much as each buyer, independent
of identity or treatment: each buyer earns 0.80, compared to 4.80 for the monopolist. Notice that the
competitive, rather than the monopoly, price serves as our benchmark for ¯xing the surplus-division
ratio. Duopolists' prices in Ru²e (2000) were found to converge to the competitive equilibrium or
well below it. Despite a monopolist seller in our experiments, we (correctly) anticipated prices again
to be around the competitive range. To see why, note that at the monopoly price, the seller earns
36.66 times as much as each buyer in the two-buyer treatment and 42.66 times as much in the four-
buyer treatment. With full information about demand and cost parameters, even mild inequality
aversion would push prices below the monopoly level. Thus, we do not view our experiments as a
good test of monopoly power, but rather a well-calibrated test of the impact of buyer concentration
on the pricing of a monopolist.
Our choice to employ a monopolist eliminates possible seller concerns and uncertainty about the
simultaneous price choice of additional sellers, thereby allowing us to concentrate on the impact
of the buyers' decisions on monopolist pricing without the complication of competition between
multiple sellers.
Finally, four units of demand combined with the monopolist's cost curve imply that each buyer,
again independent of treatment or identity, possesses market power. We adapt to the case of buyers
the de¯nition of seller market power applied by the 1984 Department of Justice horizontal merger
guidelines. We de¯ne unilateral buyer market power as the ability of an individual buyer to deviate
pro¯tably from passive price taking.5 Assuming that the seller and all other buyers behave
competitively, an individual buyer in our experiments may pro¯t by unilaterally deviating: by
5 In Cournot quantity-choice experiments, Holt (1989) ¯rst implemented experimentally the notion of seller uni-
lateral market power.
7withholding two of his four units of demand, the resulting demand curve intersects the monopolist's
cost curve at the second-to-last step. At the resultant lower price, the withholding buyer earns
more from his two remaining purchases than he does by making all four pro¯table purchases at the
original competitive equilibrium price.6
3.2 Experimental Procedures
All experimental sessions were computerized using software programmed in Visual Basic. Multiple
experiments (of the same treatment) were conducted simultaneously (for instance, ¯ve four-buyer
experiments at a time or eight two-buyer experiments at a time) to preserve subject anonymity.7
Each round in the posted-o®er market consisted of the following sequence of events. The
monopolist selected a price and chose a quantity to make available for sale at that price. The
monopolist's price (but not quantity) was displayed to all buyers. The buyers were randomly
ordered, and each buyer in turn proceeded to purchase the number of units that he desired. Buyers'
purchasing and withholding decisions were made privately so that buyers were unable to observe
the number of purchases (and units withheld) of other buyers. In addition, buyers did not learn
the number of units sold by the monopolist. These institutional details rendered it impossible for
buyers to coordinate their responses to the monopolist, to provide a particularly tough test of the
ability of concentrated buyers to in°uence prices. The period ended when the last buyer had an
opportunity to shop.8
This sequence of events was repeated for 30 rounds. At the end of the experiment, subjects were
paid a 15 NIS (New Israeli Shekel) showup payment in addition to their experimental earnings.
Average seller earnings (including the showup payment) were 121 NIS compared to 67 NIS for the
buyers.9 Sessions lasted between one hour and one hour and thirty minutes.
6 The impact of demand withholding on this increasing-cost monopolist is still quite modest compared to a
monopolist with decreasing costs against whom withholding would ¯rst hit his most pro¯table, lowest-cost units.
7 The instructions to participants are available from the authors upon request.
8 Note the structural similarity between the posted-o®er monopoly game and the ultimatum game. The seller's
posted price serves as a proposal to divide the available surplus with the buyers. Each buyer may then accept or reject
the proposed surplus division. Despite their apparent similarities, results from dozens of experiments demonstrate
that they are behaviorally distinct. Ho®man, McCabe, Shachat and Smith (1994) provide the most direct comparison
of the two games by framing an ultimatum game as a posted-o®er market. Their results show that the market frame
produces signi¯cantly lower o®ers without a®ecting rejection rates.
9 At the time these experiments were conducted 4 NIS was equivalent to approximately $1 U.S.
8All sessions were conducted at Ben-Gurion University. Seven two-buyer informed experiments
were conducted along with eight four-buyer informed experiments. (Recall that the \informed"
experiments indicate that the monopolist knew the precise number of buyers in the market.) All
subjects were economics or business majors and had taken at least an introductory course in
microeconomics. Participation was restricted to one experiment per subject.
4 Results
4.1 Full-Information (Informed) Treatments
We begin by addressing the following two questions: 1) Are a small number of buyers able to bring
prices down below the monopoly level? 2) Are two buyers able to achieve lower prices than four
buyers? The summary statistics presented in Table 1 and the price graphs in Figure 2 answer both
questions in the a±rmative.
[insert Table 1 here]
Result 1 Buyers in both treatments achieve prices signi¯cantly below the monopoly price. More-
over, prices in the two-buyer treatment are substantially lower than prices in the four-buyer treat-
ment.
The ¯rst noteworthy observation from these experiments is that buyers in these markets are
able to obtain prices well below the monopoly price. As shown in Table 1, the median posted
price taken over all periods in all experiments in the two-buyer treatment is ¡0:07, two units below
the lower bound of the competitive tunnel. This same statistic for the four-buyer treatment is
+0.12, midway between the competitive and monopoly prices.10 These statistics hide the price
dispersion across the di®erent sessions. Column (1) of Table 1 organizes the experiments within
each treatment in descending order by median session price (column (2)). What stands out are the
three four-buyer experiments in which the price is just below the monopoly price (4B13, 4B14 and
10 We report the median experiment and treatment prices throughout the paper. The mean prices are very similar
if we exclude the ¯rst two periods in which in a few of the experiments prices are exceptionally high, above the buyers'
valuations.
94B9), the three two-buyer experiments in which the price is substantially below the competitive
range (2B6, 2B3 and 2B7), and the remainder of experiments (a mixture of two-buyer and four-
buyer experiments) in which the price falls within the competitive range. Treating the median
session price as one observation, we can reject the null hypothesis that the two price distributions
come from the same underlying population distribution at the 98% con¯dence level (Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney nonparametric test exact p-value=.020).
In the three four-buyer sessions (4B13, 4B14 and 4B9) in which the monopolist's median price
is just a unit or three below the monopoly price, a comparison of columns (6) and (7) in Table
1 indicates that the monopolist earns between 13 and 49 times as much as the typical buyer in
his session! These extreme earnings inequalities in conjunction with withholding levels that are
relatively low (4B14 and 4B9) or slightly above average (4B13) make clear the strength of the
posting side of the market and the apparent disregard for fairness considerations on both sides of
the market in these full-information experiments.11
[insert Figure 2 here]
Another aspect of the di®erence in pricing between these two treatments can be seen in the
price gap between them in the early and intermediate periods, as seen in Figure 2. Comparing
the price distributions of the two treatments on a period-by-period basis (with a total of only 15
independent observations per period), the results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney nonparametric tests
indicate that we can reject the equality of the two price distributions at the 95% con¯dence level
in periods 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14 and 16, and at the 90% con¯dence level in periods 2, 3, 8, 11, 15,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 29. These results and Figure 2 also point to an end-game e®ect in these
experiments: prices in both treatments converge to the competitive price range. Of the last nine
periods, only period 29 yields a marginally signi¯cant di®erence between the price distributions of
11 Plott and Smith (1984) discuss the relative weakness of the non-posting side of the market in posted-o®er and
posted-bid experiments. The stylized ¯nding from posted-o®er experiments is that prices settle at monopoly levels or
converge slowly from above to the competitive equilibrium, even with advance seller production by which sellers incur
the cost of production upfront (Mestelman and Williams, 1988) or with extreme earnings inequalities between sellers
and buyers. Related to this latter case, Cason and Williams (1990) show that prices converge to the competitive
equilibrium from above, despite a design in which the sellers earn all of the surplus at the competitive price. The fact
that buyers accept such surplus inequalities in posted-o®er experiments stands in stark contrast to many two-player
bargaining game experiments, such as ultimatum and alternating o®er games, in which 50:50 is the modal split.
10the two treatments.
The regressions in Table 2 con¯rm the signi¯cant price discount in the two-buyer treatment and
the end-game e®ect. The coe±cient of 0.16 on the four-buyer treatment dummy in regression (1)
reveals a 16-unit price premium on average compared to the two-buyer treatment. Dummies for
each treatment interacted with a dummy for the last ¯ve periods indicate a signi¯cant end-game
e®ect in the four-buyer treatment only as prices continue to converge to the competitive range from
above. Interestingly, the impact of the previous period's sales lost to withholding on current-period
price is not quite marginally signi¯cant (p=0.107).
[insert Table 2 here]
The question remains why are prices in the two-buyer treatment substantially lower?
Result 2 Demand withholding per buyer, per period in the two-buyer treatment is not signi¯-
cantly di®erent from that in the four-buyer treatment.
The observed di®erence in prices between the two treatments obtains despite the fact that the
number of units withheld per buyer, per period was, surprisingly, nearly identical in the two treat-
ments (0.793 in the two-buyer treatment versus 0.766 in the four-buyer treatment). Alternatively,
the number of sales lost to demand withholding per buyer per period was, again, nearly identical
in the two treatments (0.695 versus 0.698).12 We cannot reject the hypothesis that the average
number of units withheld per buyer, per period in a session (column 5 of Table 1) are the same
in the two treatments (the exact p-values from the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests is .35) nor the
hypothesis that the average number of sales lost to withholding per buyer, per period (column 4 of
Table 1) are the same in the two treatments (exact p-value=.50). Moreover, the insigni¯cant coef-
¯cients on lagged sales lost to withholding interacted with each of the two treatments in regression
(2) of Table 2 indicate that withholding does not signi¯cantly a®ect the seller's next-period pricing
decision in either treatment, nor does the seller react di®erently to withholding between treatments
(p-value=0.44 in t-test of coe±cients).
12 The number of sales lost to withholding and the number of units withheld are closely related measures, but
need not be identical in every period. A di®erence arises when a buyer withholds a unit of demand and a subsequent
buyer in the same period purchases this unit so that the seller does not lose any sales to withholding.
11From the similar withholding patterns in the two treatments, it does not necessarily follow
that the lower prices in two-buyer markets are irrational. We do not observe the buyers' demand
withholding had the monopolist set prices in the two-buyer sessions at the same levels as those in the
four-buyer sessions. Perhaps, withholding in the two-buyer sessions would have been appreciably
higher at higher prices. As it stands, the monopolists appear as if they have calibrated their prices
to equate the levels of withholding in the two treatments. Sales quotas provide one rationale for this
calibration: for instance, a sales target of 83% of available capacity is consistent with the observed
withholding patterns.
The observed disparity in buyers' as well as sellers' pro¯ts as a function of the treatment follows
naturally from the ¯rst two results. Lower prices and identical withholding levels explain why
individual buyers in the two-buyer treatment earned more than those in the four-buyer treatment,
while sellers' pro¯ts are greater in the four-buyer treatment.
To provide some measure of just how ine®ective our posted-o®er monopolists are against a small
number of buyers, we calculate the index of monopoly e®ectiveness, M, given by:
M = (¼A ¡ ¼C)=(¼M ¡ ¼C);
where ¼A is actual pro¯t, ¼C is competitive pro¯t, and ¼M is monopoly pro¯t.
This measure makes possible a comparison of results across experiments with di®erent design
parameters by normalizing the monopolist's actual pro¯t by the di®erence between the theoretical
monopoly and competitive pro¯ts. For example, a value of M = 1 (M = 0) would indicate that
the seller achieves monopoly (competitive) pro¯ts. Based on ¯nal period pro¯ts, Holt (1995, p.
381) computes this index for six di®erent posted-o®er monopoly experiments with di®erent cost
structures (decreasing or increasing), buyer types (human or simulated) and regulatory mechanisms.
He ¯nds that the index varies from 0.44 (simulated buyers, decreasing costs and a cost-based
regulatory mechanism (Harrison, McKee and Rutstrom, 1989)) to 1.0 (human buyers and increasing
costs (Smith, 1981)). Like Smith (1981), our experimental design also involves human buyers and
increasing marginal costs. However, our index of monopoly e®ectiveness, also based on ¯nal period
pro¯ts, lies well below the above-reported range. We ¯nd M = ¡1:88 in the two-buyer treatment
12and M = 0:005 in the four-buyer treatment. That is to say, the competitive or even slightly below
competitive prices along with some residual withholding lead to pro¯ts at or below competitive
levels in both our posted-o®er monopoly treatments. In section 5, we reconcile previous results
with ours.
4.2 Uninformed Treatments
The ¯nding that two buyers achieved lower prices than four buyers has at least two possible sources.
First, at equivalent prices, two buyers (would have) withheld more than four buyers such that
the monopolist's best response involves o®ering a price discount to two buyers. We refer to this
explanation as the buyer withholding hypothesis. Second, at equivalent prices, the monopolist
believes that two buyers will withhold more than four buyers. Given these beliefs, the monopolist
best responds by o®ering a price discount to two buyers. We refer to this explanation as the cautious
monopolist hypothesis.
To investigate these two hypotheses, we conducted a second pair of two-buyer (7 experiments)
and four-buyer (8 experiments) \uninformed" treatments with marginal cost and demand param-
eters identical to those employed in the \informed" treatments. The sole di®erence between the
two pairs of treatments is that in the uninformed treatments, the monopolist only was not told
how many buyers were in the market; instead, he was told (in both the two-buyer and four-buyer
uninformed treatments) that he faced \a small number of buyers, but more than one". Since
multiple experiments were conducted simultaneously, monopolists could not infer anything about
the number of buyers from the number of people in the room. The monopolist's sales quantity
similarly revealed nothing about the number of buyers in the market because the monopolist knew
only the aggregate demand curve he faced and not the individual demand curves. Buyers, on the
other hand, knew precisely how many other buyers were present along with them in the market
and knew that the monopolist did not know the number of buyers in the market.
Since the monopolist only is uninformed, the monopolist's motive for pricing cautiously is
removed: the price gap observed between the two informed treatments should disappear in these
uninformed treatments and per-buyer withholding should not be signi¯cantly di®erent in the two
13markets. On the other hand, if the buyer withholding hypothesis explains the price gap between the
two informed treatments, then attempts by the monopolist to equate prices in the two uninformed
treatments will be met with relatively high levels of withholding in the two-buyer uninformed
treatment. For su±ciently high levels of withholding in this treatment, the monopolist may lower
his price to assuage the buyers, resulting in lower prices in the two-buyer informed experiments.
The end result, according to this hypothesis, may be that the monopolist posts lower prices in
the two-buyer uninformed experiments such that the levels of withholding in the two uninformed
treatments have been equated, outcomes parallel to those in the two informed treatments.
Result 3 lends initial support to the cautious monopolist hypothesis.
Result 3 Prices in the two-buyer, uninformed and four-buyer uninformed sessions both start
out above, but gradually fall within, the competitive range. Prices in these two treatments are
very similar from the beginning of the experiments through the middle rounds. However, in the
middle rounds, prices begin to diverge signi¯cantly. Prices in the four-buyer sessions remain within
the competitive price range, whereas prices in the two-buyer sessions fall below the competitive
equilibrium.
Figure 3 shows that the median prices are very similar through period 14. However, beginning
in period 15 prices start to diverge: the median price settles in the competitive range in the four-
buyer (4B) treatment, whereas the median price in the two-buyer (2B) treatment falls below the
equilibrium price, and continues falling throughout the duration. The results of period-by-period
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two price
distributions are the same at the 5% level in any of the ¯rst 16 periods. (We can reject the null
at the 10% level in periods 11, 15, and 16.) However, the price divergence that begins in period
15 becomes signi¯cant at the 5% level in period 17 and increases in signi¯cance throughout the
remainder of the experiments.
[insert Figure 3 here]
That initial and intermediate prices are indistinguishable in the 2B and 4B uninformed treat-
ments lends support to the cautious pricing hypothesis, namely, observed price di®erences in the
14informed treatments can at least be partially explained by the monopolist pricing more cautiously
against two buyers than against four. Once the monopolist does not know how many buyers he
faces, the price gap observed in the informed treatments disappears.
It is worth noting that the disappearance of the early price gap between the two uninformed
treatments allows us to reject a design-related explanation for the observed price gap in the informed
treatments: recall that in order to maintain a constant monopolist-to-individual-buyer pro¯t ratio,
interior steps of the monopolist's cost curve were set lower in the two-buyer treatment than in the
four-buyer treatment. While this should not matter theoretically, one might argue that, psycholog-
ically, this design feature o®ers the monopolist in the two-buyer treatment a \comfort zone" below
the competitive price that doesn't exist in the four-buyer treatment. The ¯nding that the price gap
in the uninformed treatments disappears, even though the demand and cost con¯gurations were
common knowledge in all treatments, allows us to reject this explanation.
Having observed similar prices in the two treatments through the middle rounds, the cautious
monopolist hypothesis also predicts similar withholding behavior. Result 4 con¯rms this prediction.
Result 4 The overall aggregate quantities of demand withholding and sales lost to demand with-
holding are identical in the uninformed two-buyer and four-buyer treatments. Furthermore, the
distributions over time of these withholding measures are not signi¯cantly di®erent for the vast
majority of rounds of play. Only in the late rounds do marginally signi¯cant di®erences between
the two treatments appear.
The number of units of demand withheld per buyer, per period is 0.821 in the 2B, uninformed
treatment compared to 0.824 units in the 4B, uninformed treatment (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
z=¡0:167, p-value=.87 where a buyer's average withholding over the entire session is treated as an
independent observation). Similarly, the number of sales lost to demand withholding per buyer,
per period is 0.744 units in the 2B treatment compared to 0.774 in the 4B treatment (Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney exact p-value=.35).
Moreover, an examination of the distribution of demand withholding over the 30 periods by
treatment reveals strong similarities between the treatments. Figure 4 plots the average per period
15sales lost to withholding for the uninformed 2B and 4B treatments. Sales lost to withholding start
out at low levels in both treatments (0.2 units on average). Withholding quickly intensi¯es and
remains at relatively high levels beyond round 20 when, in both treatments, withholding begins
to decay. Results from the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test reveal that only in period 22 are the
distributions of average sales lost to withholding signi¯cantly di®erent at the 5% level. (In periods
21, 23, 25 and 27, the di®erence is signi¯cant at the 10% level.)
[insert Figure 4 here]
Taken together, Results 3 and 4 support the cautious pricing hypothesis: the observed di®erence
in initial pricing in the informed treatments can be attributed to the monopolist pricing more
tentatively when confronted with only two buyers. When the number of buyers is unknown to
the monopolist, Result 3 shows that the initial price di®erential disappears. Had buyers in the
2B treatment withheld less than those in the 4B treatment, for instance, the monopolist's initial
pricing behavior could perhaps be explained, in part, by a response to the observed withholding
behavior in the two treatments. This confound however is not present in our data. The ¯nding
that the withholding behavior is identical in the two treatments (Result 4) therefore strengthens
our conclusion that the lower pricing in the two-buyer informed treatment follows simply from the
monopolist's more cautious reaction to two buyers.13
4.3 Pricing Over Time
To gain additional insights into the monopolist's pricing behavior we estimated a ¯rst-di®erences
model in which both the price and the number of units withheld at time t ¡ 1 are used to explain
the pricing decision at time t. We report results from the two-step estimator of Anderson and
Hsiao (1980), which uses lags of variables as instruments for the lagged dependent variable on the
13 Our support for the cautious monopolist hypothesis is in the spirit of a conjecture raised by Davis and Williams
(1991). They test whether seller market power might inhibit convergence to the competitive equilibrium. Prices exceed
the competitive equilibrium by at least $0.30 in each of their four simulated-buyer experiments, while only one of four
human-buyer experiments deviates from the competitive price. They conclude that \...computer-simulated buyers
may generate qualitatively di®erent results than similar posted-o®er markets using human buyers, even if human
buyers fully reveal demand. Posted-o®er sellers appear initially to employ more tentative strategies when facing
human buyers than when facing simulated buyers. This conjecture bears further analysis." (p. 273)
16right-hand side of the model. The estimator controls for the fact that least squares estimates are
biased in dynamic panel models.
The regression model is:
pit = ¯1pit¡1 + ¯2Wit¡1 + ¯34BInf + ¯44BUninf + ¯52BUninf + ni + vit;
where pit and pit¡1 represent the price that monopolist i sets at time t and t ¡ 1 respectively;
Wit¡1 represents the number of sales lost to withholding at time t¡1; 4BInf is a dummy variable
that represents the four-buyer informed sessions, 4BUninf represents the four-buyer uninformed
sessions, and 2BUninf represents the two-buyer uninformed sessions; ni is a time invariant in-
dividual e®ect, and vit is seller i's error at time t. The model is ¯rst di®erenced to remove the
unobserved individual e®ects, and the treatment dummies are added after di®erencing. Hence the
dummy variables test for a di®erence between experimental treatments in pricing trends, not levels.
This yields the following speci¯cation:
¢pit = ¯1¢pit¡1 + ¯2¢Wit¡1 + ¯34BInf + ¯44BUninf + ¯52BUninf + ¢vit;
where ¢ represents the di®erence operator so that, for example, ¢pit = pit ¡ pit¡1. The Anderson
and Hsiao (1980) instrumental variable estimator uses a set of instruments, which are taken from
the set of lagged explanatory variables, to correct for the endogeneity of ¢pit¡1. An important
choice of instruments is whether to use the level pit¡2 or the di®erence ¢pit¡2. Arellano and Bond
(1991) show that the level instrument pit¡2 yields better ¯nite sample properties, thus we use it
but report the sensitivity of the results to other choices of instruments. We test the robustness
of the speci¯cation by testing both one-step and two-step estimators. We report results from a
two-step Anderson and Hsiao (1980) type instrumental variable estimator using ¢Wit¡2, ¢Wit¡1,
and pit¡2 as instruments for ¢pit¡1. For the regressions we used the dynamic panel data module
in PcGive Professional (Hendry and Doornik, 2001). We base our inferences on results that are
robust to these di®erent speci¯cations.
[insert Table 3 here]
17Table 3 presents the regression results. There are 770 total observations (two cross sections are
lost in constructing lags and ¯rst di®erences). The regression passes speci¯cation tests: a Wald
test of the joint signi¯cance of the regressors is signi¯cant at better than the 1% level (Â2 = 11:23,
df = 2), the Sargan tests accepts the lack of serial correlation in the errors, and AR(1) and AR(2)
speci¯cation tests are passed. The asymptotic standard errors we report are robust to general
cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity.
The positive but small and signi¯cant coe±cient on the lagged dependent variable indicates a
small sensitivity to past pricing decisions. The negative and signi¯cant coe±cient on the previous
period's lost sales to withholding indicates that the monopolists are in°uenced by the buyers'
demand withholding decisions in a logical manner: an increase in the number of lost sales to
withholding results on average in a lower price in the next period. The only treatment dummy
variable that may be signi¯cant is for the two-buyer uninformed sessions: the negative coe±cient,
with a p-value of 0.073, indicates that the trend in pricing in the two-buyer uninformed sessions is
negative compared with the two-buyer informed sessions.
To test for the robustness of our model speci¯cation, we repeated the exercise using a one-
step estimator. We then added to our set of instruments the ¯rst di®erence of the second lag of
the dependent variable (¢pit¡2) and repeated both the one-step and two-step estimations. All of
the ¯ndings reported in Table 3 hold across speci¯cations except for the signi¯cance of the two-
buyer uninformed dummy variable. Since this result is not unambiguously robust to reasonable
di®erences in the model's speci¯cation, we conclude that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
pricing trends are the same in the di®erent experimental treatments.
These regressions shed further light on the monopolist's reaction to buyer withholding, the
information level and the number of buyers in the market. First, as may be expected, withholding
decisions a®ect the dynamics of the pricing decisions across experimental treatments: sellers respond
to withholding by lowering the next-period price in proportion to the increase in units withheld.14
Second, the pricing dynamics appear largely insensitive to experimental treatment. Thus, the
14 Compare this highly signi¯cant result with the almost marginally signi¯cant impact of the amount of withholding
on the next-period price in regression (2) of Table 2. The implication is that the level of withholding is less meaningful
for monopolist pricing than the change in withholding from one period to the next in response to price changes.
18presence of fewer buyers, when known to the monopolist, brings about immediate price concessions;
however, once these concessions are in place, we ¯nd no strong evidence that the monopolist's
pricing dynamics di®er across treatments. This result is consistent with the cautious monopolist
hypothesis.
5 Discussion
5.1 The Behavioral Salience of the Experimental Design
Our main result reveals that two buyers achieve signi¯cantly lower prices than four buyers against a
monopolist. Along the way, we observed considerable buyer demand withholding and competitive
or even below competitive pricing, two ¯ndings that need to be reconciled with the more usual
observations of inactive buyers and monopoly or near-monopoly pricing in posted-o®er markets.
At the other extreme, Smith's (1981) posted-o®er monopoly session reveals quick convergence to
the monopoly price and no units of demand withheld by any of the ¯ve buyers.
These disparate ¯ndings highlight the importance of the underlying cost and demand parameters
and the information conditions. In Smith's private-information experiment, each of the ¯ve buyers
possessed only a single unit of demand, making withholding very costly. Moreover, the monopolist
earned ten times as much as each buyer at the monopoly price and only twice as much at the
competitive price, and even these relatively mild inequalities were unknown to market participants
who observed the costs or values of their own units only. By comparison, each buyer possesses
four units of demand in our design. At the monopoly price, a buyer earns 15 units on the ¯rst
purchase and 0 pro¯t on the next two purchases. The monopolist, by contrast, earns 550 units in
the two-buyer treatment and 640 in the four-buyer treatment, resulting in pro¯t ratios of 36.66:1
and 42.66:1 in favor of the monopolist. However, a buyer can costlessly withhold two units of
demand to reduce the monopolist's pro¯t to 400 units in the two-buyer case and to 540 units in
the four-buyer case, yielding a more modest 6:1 pro¯t ratio in both treatments. Given the common
knowledge of the underlying parameters along with a mild concern for fairness, buyers will withhold
at the monopoly price. To avoid costly withholding, the monopolist lowers price to the competitive
19range.
In summary, the buyers' ability to punish the monopolist cheaply and e®ectively renders the
monopoly price unlikely. Thus, throughout the paper we have emphasized the observed price
di®erential between the two-buyer and four-buyer treatments, rather than the price levels. One
avenue for future research would be to design an experiment more germane to the monopoly outcome
to pit monopoly power against buyer countervailing power.
5.2 An Application to Increasing Industrial Concentration
Fuelled primarily by an ongoing horizontal merger wave, industrial concentration in the U.S. has
increased over the past two decades and is expected to continue to increase over at least the decade
to come (see Pryor, 2001). According to our results in a laboratory environment that trades
o® realism for control, rising industrial concentration needn't necessarily be a cause for concern:
one must probe on an industry-by-industry basis whether a rise in concentration constitutes an
increase in the original or the countervailing market power. As a case in point, Dobson and
Waterson (1997) claim that U.K. competition authorities seem to be alert to the potential role
of countervailing power. They report evidence from the U.K. of increased concentration in the
retail sector, contrasted with declining concentration in manufacturing in recent years. In spite
of the former, Dobson and Waterson argue that \U.K. competition authorities have remained
largely impassive toward this increase in concentration" (p. 418), and that they have taken a
\benign view of consolidation in retailing ...in contrast to the position adopted in the United States
...[Consequently,] U.S. concentration levels in retailing have generally risen at a much slower pace
than in the United Kingdom" (p. 419).
One unanswered question is, are the reduced prices achieved by the consolidated U.K. retailers
passed on to ¯nal consumers? One interpretation of the U.K.'s passivity toward retailer consolida-
tion is that they believe this to be the case. The same question may well asked in our setup. Two
buyers in our experiments achieved signi¯cantly lower prices than four buyers. Do atomistic, ¯nal
consumers ultimately bene¯t from these lower prices? Theoretical models by von Ungern-Sternberg
(1996) and Dobson and Waterson (1997) show that whether powerful buyers pass on cost savings to
20¯nal consumers depends on the degree of competition between these intermediate buyers as sellers
in the ¯nal-product market.
What is for certain is that these lower prices have come at the expense of reduced market
e±ciency. Through demand withholding (the only strategic action at the disposal of posted-o®er
buyers), buyers forced prices down. Similar price levels in more symmetric market institutions such
as the double-auction or pit market, the bilateral negotiation institution (Cason et al., 2003) or
the multilateral negotiation institution (Thomas and Wilson, 2002) needn't compromise e±ciency.
The possibility of repeated price negotiations in these market institutions can generate lower prices.
It remains to be seen whether such prices can indeed be obtained in these institutions. On the
one hand, buyers' enlarged space of available actions associated with these market mechanisms
favors lower prices compared to the posted-o®er market. On the other hand, the ease with which
posted-o®er buyers can commit to not buying in a given period and the costliness of this action
to the posted-o®er monopolist encourages him to slash his price in the next period. In real-time
double auction or pit markets, for instance, patience or, at best, a modest price reduction may be
the monopolist's response to a buyer's refusal to accept his ask price. Examining the impact of
buyer concentration in these more symmetric market institutions that more closely resemble the
bargaining structure typical of intermediate product markets is another promising direction for this
research agenda.
6 Conclusion
We designed a series of experiments to examine the impact of buyer concentration on seller pricing.
On the one hand, we presented buyers with an onerous task: buyers face an increasing-cost mo-
nopolist, are unable to collude or even signal their actions to others and are limited to accepting or
rejecting posted prices. On the other hand, in an e®ort to induce at least some buyers to reject prof-
itable purchases, we designed our experiments to include a substantial surplus inequality between
the monopolist and individual buyers at the monopoly and the competitive prices. Indeed, we ob-
serve substantial variation among buyers in their withholding patterns. However, in the aggregate,
21buyers withhold demand to the same extent in the two-buyer and four-buyer treatments.
Notwithstanding, we ¯nd that two buyers achieve signi¯cantly lower prices than four buyers.
By manipulating the monopolist's information, we are able to identify the source of the price gap.
When the monopolist (but not the buyers) is uninformed about the number of buyers in the market,
the price gap between the two-buyer and four-buyer treatments disappears. As a result, we are
able to attribute lower pricing in the informed two-buyer treatment to the monopolist's cautious
or conservative pricing for fear of provoking costly withholding. Put di®erently, the monopolist
appears to place a higher subjective probability on buyers withholding demand above a given price
threshold in the informed two-buyer treatment than the informed four-buyer one. Therefore, to
avoid triggering this price threshold in the two-buyer sessions, he o®ers a lower price.
Our experimental parameters were chosen so that the monopoly (and even competitive) prices
are identical in the markets with two and four buyers. Thus, according to the theory, the number
of buyers should play no role in the take-it-or-leave prices set by the monopolist. By contrast,
our results provide the basis for a behavioral theory of buyer countervailing power. For example,
\reputation e®ects" as in Kreps et al. (1982) might account for withholding behavior in early
periods of the game. Moreover, sellers' immediate reaction to the number of buyers before any
game history is observed in the informed treatments o®ers evidence that the number of buyers may
be a useful parameter in such a theory.
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   Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Two-Buyer and Four-Buyer Informed Experiments 
 
  Median  Mean  No. of Sales  No. of Units  Mean Buyer  Mean 
Experiment  Posted  Efficiency  Lost per  Withheld per  Profit per  Monopolist 
  Price    Buyer-period  Buyer-period  Period  Profit per Period 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
2B4  0.05  0.80  0.32  0.32  0.52  4.09 
2B5  0.035  0.83  0.62  0.62  0.60  4.09 
2B2  0  0.55  1.30  1.30  0.61  2.28 
2B1  -0.02  0.91  0.43  0.43  0.72  4.38 
2B6  -0.21  0.84  0.63  0.70  1.20  3.12 
2B3  -0.25  0.74  0.52  0.82  1.14  2.44 















4B13  0.19  0.69  0.78  0.91  0.32  4.21 
4B14  0.19  0.68  0.61  0.61  0.23  4.54 
4B9  0.165  0.74  0.52  0.53  0.11  5.43 
4B12  0.04  0.90  0.41  0.46  0.67  4.57 
4B15  0.04  0.75  0.85  0.87  0.49  4.01 
4B8  0.025  0.80  0.64  0.69  0.58  4.09 
4B11  0  0.72  0.92  1.09  0.66  3.16 
















Session-level summary statistics arranged in descending order by median posted price (column (2)). For 
each statistic, the overall treatment average is also reported (standard deviation in parentheses).  
  
Table 2: OLS Panel Regressions 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error)  Variable  Description 
(1)  (2) 
          
0.0714  0.0718  pit-1  monopolist's price at t-1 
(0.0566)  (0.0565) 
         
-0.0080  Wit-1  sales lost to withholding at t-1 
(0.0046) 
--- 
         
sales lost to withholding at t-1  -0.0143  Wit-1*2BInf 
in 2B informed treatment 
--- 
(0.0117) 
         
sales lost to withholding at t-1  -0.0049  Wit-1*4BInf 
in 4B informed treatment 
--- 
(0.0036) 
         
0.1604***  0.1421**  4BInf  4 Buyer Informed  
(0.0466)  (0.0611) 
         
-0.0122  -0.0144  last5*2BInf  last 5 periods in 2 Buyer Informed  
(0.0357)  (0.0391) 
         
-0.0486**  -0.0462**  last5*4BInf  last 5 periods in 4 Buyer Informed 
(0.0166)  (0.0161) 
         
  -0.0736  -0.0643 
Constant 
  (0.0455)  (0.0536) 
adjusted R
2     0.289  0.287 
       
Dependent Variable: pit     
     
*** p-value less than .01     
**  p-value less than .05     
*   p-value less than .10     
       
OLS regressions on the seller's period t price in the informed treatments only.  
Standard errors in parentheses correct for heteroskedasticity and possible  
correlation across periods played by the same seller.   Table 3:  Dynamic Panel Regression Estimates 
 
 
          
Dependent Variable: pit- pit-1 
 
*** p-value less than .01 
**  p-value less than .05 
*   p-value less than .10 
 
Dynamic panel regressions on the pooled data from the 
informed and uninformed treatments.   
Coefficient  Variable  Description 
(Std. Error) 
     
0.0111** 
∆pit-1  Price  (0.005) 
     
-0.0044*** 
∆Wit-1  Units Withheld  (0.002) 
     
0.0006  4BInf  4 Buyer Informed  (0.002) 
     
-0.0003  4BUninf  4 Buyer Uninformed  (0.002) 
     
-0.0054* 
2BUninf  2 Buyer Uninformed  (0.003) 
     
-0.0026  Constant   
(0.0018) Figure 1a: Two-Buyer Treatment Parameters 
 
 
The monopolist’s marginal cost and the buyers’ demand curve in the two-buyer experiments. The 
competitive  price  range  lies  in  the  interval  between  the  prices  –0.05  and  0.05.  All  costs  and 
valuations are expressed as deviations from the midpoint of the competitive price range, which is 
normalized to 0. Each of the two symmetric buyers possesses four units of demand, the first unit of 
which is valued at +0.35, the second and third units have values of +0.20 each, and the fourth unit 
has a value of +0.05. 
 
                       Figure 1b: Four-Buyer Treatment Parameters 
 
 
The monopolist’s marginal cost and the buyers’ demand curve in the four-buyer experiments. The 
competitive  price  range  and  individual  buyers’  demand  curves  are  identical  to  the  two-buyer 
treatment.  All  costs  and  valuations  are  expressed  as  deviations  from  the  midpoint  of  the 






   
Figure  2:  Median  price  series  for  the  7  two-buyer  experiments  (2B)  and  8  four-buyer  (4B) 
experiments in which the monopolist knew precisely how many buyers he faced. 
Median Prices by Period for Informed 




























Median Prices by Period for Uninformed 



























Figure 3: Median price series for the 7 two-buyer (2B) and 8 four-buyer (4B) experiments in 
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Figure  4: Times  series  plots  for  the  per  buyer,  per  period  sales  lost  to  demand  withholding 
averaged over all of the experiments in each of the two uninformed treatments in which the 
monopolist did not know how many buyers he faced.  
 
 